Steve RCR et al
Lets keep it polite - please; I believe that you omitted the word from your last request to mine. Thanks.
I would more than hope that those play testing and commenting on the forum for the second edition of BLBs are in the very least familiar with the contents of the book and therefore the manner in which warfare was conducted within the period.
For example I have seen some of the comments on the movement poll thread and they give rise to some grave concerns.
Movement rates (in line or other formations for that matter) along with fire ranges and effects must be relative to actual time and distance only. These must then tie into the ground and time scales. If not the relationships created would only distort the outcomes provided by the rule set. In 40 years of gaming (both in competition and none competitive gaming) I have seen and experienced the effects of both good and bad models prescribed. The latter mainly going the way of all things due to producing a poor reflection of realistic expectation and actual events. Let us remember that these are games after all but they are of the historical rather than fantasy gendre. There is always a danger that personal preferences may influence further rule set development here.
Those fortunate to have a large playing surface may therefore experience the deployment of forces from column of march to line, whilst those with smaller provision may not. We should however remember that army deployment in this period from column of march to battle line formation was a protracted affair; sometimes taking hours. Etiquette and protocol demanded that full consideration to the rules of engagement be followed and applied. Rarely have I seen a rule set which takes correctly into account those requirements – imagine playing a game the first eight turns (BLB 2 to 3 hours historical battle time represented) of which was allotted to bring the player’s army into battle line. Boring game or realistic?
Similarly the current proposal to allow platoon system units to increase to half move distance and fire raises the question of why. Is reflecting realism the driver here or is it a personal preference?
Platoon system fire effect is already well considered with the “plus one” firing factor (British or Dutch post 1701). The method was not adopted on the battlefield to enable quicker closure to hostiles. It was introduced to maximise the effect of oblique firing across files by shallow lines into denser targets (see account by Capt Parker of the Royal Irish regiment engaged at Malplaquet 1709 - differential effects of rank versus platoon firing methods over similar ranges) and to ensure that a unit held a considerable reserve of potential firepower continuously.
In the Malplaquet example two British platoon Division firings (i.e. in total, half of the battalion firing) produced some 40 casualties whilst the corresponding two French rank volleys totalled less than one tenth of that number. The latter damage being no less than other European armies might expect to incur through rank firing methods.
Noseworthy illustrates that although over the same period of time a similar number of individual muskets could be discharged using the two systems, the key to the increased effectiveness and therefore the popularity of the new method was the increased and detrimental effect on enemy morale through the “perceived” concentration of fire. At Malplaquet, Parker’s opponents immediately withdrew to cover based upon that experience.
The actual fire control system of platoon firing was extremely complex and dangerous for the Colonel and his accompanying drummer; placed out in front of the battalion. The likelihood of a degree of self preservation interest generated by that individual in ensuring he was not in the field of any given platoon firing suggests that any efficiency in time generated by the system to enable additional closing movement opportunity would be lost as the complex control mechanism arrangements would eat up that time efficiency period generated.
In conclusion the advantage of the new method may already be well accounted for in translating the increased casualty rate through the existing plus one factor; alternatively the factor may itself require increasing to reflect fire efficiency. The movement and firing ratio certainly should not have a bearing to warrant a 50% increase in movement potential of a unit.
However compare all of the above with another example which considers the effect of rank (and possibly individual method or Firing by Divisions or Files) firing. The brigade of English and Scottish infantry under the command of Rowe and charged with the task of storming Blenheim village suffered substantial casualties from stationary French foot units behind the barricades thrown up around that village. Even taking out of the equation the effect of the artillery firing upon their right flank, the intensity was enough to halt the attack and prevent successful execution of their perceived objective. In fact it is most likely that they actually did fulfil their true role; that of cannon fodder to pin the French right.
I therefore recommend that when proposals are made by forum members in relation to rule changes that all possible consideration of evidence be attempted and that only actual and likely outcomes be considered.
During the construction of this reply it has dawned on me the possible reason that forums are not so populated with information as Steve RCR requested. I have calculated that in the time taken to respond I could have painted another 25mm battalion. I’m off to recover said lost time.
Regards to all and please don’t take anything too personal for all our sakes.
Tim W
“Like a stone wall” Wargames Group
North Nottinghamshire
UK
http://www.freewebs.com/like-a-stone-wall/
"Courage is what it takes to stand up and speak, Courage is also what it takes to sit down and listen."
Sir Winston Churchill,